

# ***Antheil* and Musical Wholeness in the Work of A. B. Marx**

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## **Introduction**

A major theme in Adolf Bernhard Marx’s work is the idea that music has sense only to one who “participates” *in* it. According to Marx, musical *Antheil* – i.e. participatory belonging-to – is at the foundation of every musical activity, such as composing, performing, or listening (including listening analytically and critically), in its authenticity. The German word “Ant(h)eil” reflects on the participatory nature of this relation – the person or I, who relates to music, “has a part” in music, is fundamentally *partial* to it. Thus, *Antheil* is a fundamental aspect of musical wholeness itself – it is only within the I, which participates in music and is “partial” to it, that music can be “whole”. Thus, Marx’s account of musical *Antheil* is arguably a reflection of what I would like to call *musical identification* – the living, immediate state of identification between the I and music. Musical identification is a primary condition for understanding musical content and, by extension, musical form. Musical wholeness is not just a characteristic of music itself, but a characteristic of the relation between the I and music.

According to Marx, every “external” whole in the musical work – from elementary wholes like *Satz*, *Gang* or *Periode*, to the musical form – has a corresponding, “inner” whole in the composer or interpreter. Marx considers not only every creative musical act, but also the very development of musical forms as originating in the *Antheil* of the composer to music. It is precisely the *participatory identification* of the composer with the spiritual musical content, which is decisive for the compositional process and formal musical structuring.

## **Content and Form**

According to Marx, composing is the unfolding of a form from a spiritual musical content. Marx calls this spiritual content *Idea*: “no proof [of formal integrity] can be more desirable or necessary to an artwork than the Idee; for only from this can the whole of the work be properly seen

and judged” (Marx, 1824: 98; cited in: Burnham, 1990: 186).<sup>1</sup> The Idea is a condition and source for the wholeness of the musical work, as well as what makes the work unique, its concrete content. The point of intersection between Idea and composer – where they become *one* – is the *spirit*. As Scott Burnham notes, in Marx’s theory the spirit is a synthesis of all human capacities: “spirit means the working together of the diverse components of human mentality, such as reason, imagination, and emotion” (Burnham, 1990: 186). The musical work, spiritual in nature, is “a child of the whole person, for whose birth all his capacities are joined in one” (Marx, 1828: 45). The art of tones (die Tonkunst) “is all-powerful over mankind, because it seizes upon every fibre, sensually and spiritually, upon the whole body and soul, sensations and ideas” (Marx, 1853: 303)<sup>2</sup>. For an interpreter to understand a musical composition, he has to become “partial” to or “commune” with the spiritual wholeness, in which the composer has created the work. As Burnham puts it, “Marx speaks of a spiritual surrender to the artwork, a process in which the critic attempts to identify with the spirit of the artist as expressed in the work. [...] The concept of wholeness, of totality, is crucial to this communion between artist and interpreter. What is implied here is the reception of a totality (an art-work born of the total powers of a human being) by another totality (the interpreter). In other words, one’s nearest resource for understanding the spirit of another, expressed in the totality of an artwork, is the totality of one’s own spirit” (Burnham, 1990: 186). The Idea *resides* in the interpreter, thus allowing him to have an “intuitive reception of the work, a reception made possible by a process of spiritual surrender akin to an act of faith” (Burnham, 1990: 190).

*Antheil* is the core of the relation of the composer or interpreter to the musical work. The complete “enlivenment” of music is a necessary condition for its disclosure in front of the musical I: “*To truly live in [Rechtes Hineinleben] and for our art, to truly open ourselves to it [Sichihreröffnen], in short, to cultivate it in the proper manner – this is the condition on which its invaluable gifts are offered to us. But it is an indispensable condition*” (Marx, 1853: 310; translation modified). However, *Antheil* is not simply an empathetic surrender to music. As we shall see, musical *Antheil*

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<sup>1</sup> The translation is Burnham’s. „Kein Nachweis [...] kann bei einem Kunstwerk erwünschter, nöthiger sein, als die Idee; denn von dieser aus kann das Ganze nur angesehen und beurtheilt werden“.

<sup>2</sup> See also Marx, 1857: 357. The original, German-language citations from this book have also been considered and will be referenced when necessary.

consists in the fact that every whole within the musical work corresponds to a whole within the composer to the extent that they're indistinguishable. The composer cannot distinguish himself from the musical work.

The spiritual sense of music is ensured by the presence of the *Idea*. And the presence of the *Idea* is "ensured", i.e. testified to, by the *Antheil* of the *I* to it. Marx underscores that no aspect of musical life can be made sense of otherwise than through one's own perception: "In this we may be aided by the counsels of others who have made observations before us; but they must only be taken as general indications of truths, which we must not accept, unless corroborated by our own perception. For this reason, the following hints are exclusively addressed to the feelings and observations of every individual, and claim to be true only *so far* as they are confirmed by them" (Marx, 1853: 270). In other words, no entity, explored in music theory – content (*Idea*), form, composition, whole, etc. – can be apprehended otherwise, than from the *I* itself, turned inwards towards itself and towards its own musical experience.

The form of a musical work is the outward expression of its content: "every artwork has to have its own form. Because every artwork necessarily has a beginning and an end, i.e. a circumference [Umfang]; it is composed [zusammengesetzt] of parts of different kind and number – and in different ways. The quintessence [Inbegriff] of all these features is called precisely the *form* of the artwork; form is the way the content of the work – the sensation, presentation, idea of the composer – becomes external [auss-erlich], becomes a whole [Gestalt], and one can describe *the form of the artwork* more closely and definitively as the ex-pression [Aeusserung], as the *becoming external-and-whole* [das Aeusserlich- – Gestaltwerden] of its content" (Marx, 1847: 3 – 4). The origin of musical form in musical content is both what makes the form a "whole" and what precludes its abstract existence, independent of musical content: "We already had to recognize that countless artforms are possible, that there can be, in general, as many forms, as there are artworks. If all these forms could come together in particular classes, if whole series of artworks, for example all fugues or all marches, could coincide with each other with regard to the basic features of their form and if a certain number of general forms [Hauptformen] or artforms, like we previously called them, could be made out: then the school of forms [Formlehre] would be nothing more than a collection of dead models, which one wouldn't be even be able to bring together, which would not be able to enliven and support us in composition, but would

only be able to hinder and disrupt us; – if a deep, living and enlivening fundamental thought didn't lie under all forms" (Marx, 1847: 6). Musical form has no other purpose than to externalize the Idea of the musical work: "In general, one speaks so often about form as a *typus* for all works of the spirit, seeming to designate it as something existing once and for all. Yet is form something independent? Is it something other than the revelation of the *Idee*, the incarnation of thought in the musical artwork? Every ripe and healthy *Idee* must reveal itself as such in a controlled form. [...] Every *Idee* has created its own form, which must be organized like itself" (Marx, 1824: 97 – 98; cited in Burnham, 1990: 185; translation Burnham's). The Idea, as was already noted, is a unity, which the composer perceives *within himself* – the master composer "*moves in [the artform] with freedom and Antheil of the soul*" (Marx, 1847: 10). *Antheil* to the Idea means that the I senses the idea within itself as its *own* content, while the form is only the way in which this Idea is expressed externally, as music.

### Spirituality and Sensuality

According to Marx, the *Antheil* of the person to music is realized in the *spiritual* sphere. However, the nature of music, as well as the nature of man, is split apart between the spiritual and the sensual: the nature of music is, "like man's own, is twofold; partaking both of the sensual (material); and the menial (spiritual)" (Marx, 1853: 303). On one level the spiritual and sensual side are opposed. Music has the power to raise us "to a higher, more susceptible, and spiritual existence; to soften and refine our feelings, to awaken in us ideas of pure and perfect humanity" (Marx, 1853: 303), to lead us into knowing what is good and to fill us with love; and, on the other hand, to bury us in the purely sensual excitement of the senses and thoughtlessness, to weaken our spiritual capacities and to stretch us out between "those strange twins, satiety and insatiability" (Marx, 1853: 303). Thus, as Holly Watkins (2011: 58) points out, in Marx's thought the spiritual must overcome the sensual: "*The vital question for our art and its influence on the morality and the views of the people is simply this: whether its spiritual or its sensuous side is to prevail*, whether it will clean and freshen the mind [Sinn] and the heart through its inner spiritual power, whether it will enrich the spirit with intransient treasures, whether it will inspire it to ideas and thoughts of the highest, the eternal, – or will it, lacking this holy power, weaken spirit and soul, make them wither, will it bury them in the waves of deafening sensual-

ity and thoughtlessness, which dissolve and corrode everything healthy and noble?” (Marx, 1841: vi – vii; translation partially based on Watkins, 2011: 58). The paradigmatic example of “spiritual” music is German music, particularly that of Beethoven; conversely, an example of “sensual” music is Italian and French music (whose main features Marx describes as “the frivolity and ready loquacity of the French, and the enervated sensuality of the Italians” [Marx, 1853: 304]). Characteristics of Italian and French music are “a strained excitement of the senses, external splendour, coupled with internal poverty, superficial desire to please, instead of character and depth, a general inclination for that which is low, the degradation of the most significant conditions and forms to mere means of effect” (Marx, 1853: 304). A major sign of the fall into sensuality is making the means of musical expression an end in itself and neglecting musical *Antheil* – the *I* cannot truly be “partial” to “music for the senses”: “This want of character and meaning may be observed in every branch of art, and the general lack of *Antheil* [Antheillosigkeit] is increasing the more man strays from the Idea of the whole, from the significance and thought of art and the particular artworks, treating the *means* as the chief object, without regard to the *purpose*, so does that perversion which is the death of art become more palpable” (Marx, 1853: 304 – 305; translation modified). The absence of the wholeness of the musical work leads to the lack of *Antheil* of the *I* towards music. The lack of *Antheil* and the absence of wholeness are premised on the lack of spiritual content and the total prevalence of music’s sensual aspect.

According to Marx, the dichotomy spirituality-sensuality is asymmetric and hierarchical. The spiritual is more important and defining than the sensual, because the lack of the spiritual precludes musical wholeness, although “music” in some way continues to exist.<sup>3</sup> At the same time musical wholeness is impossible without sensuality. It is sensuality that unlocks the relation to the spiritual wholeness of music: “For the mere sensual delight in art also awakens an immediate spiritual *Antheil*; and it is this *spiritual Antheil to art* which we consider the highest aim of all artistic activity. Let us only be careful not to close our mind and heart stubbornly and in perverted efforts, let us not ourselves disrupt the sensation and the secret, natural weaving of our spirit, and from the immedi-

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<sup>3</sup> Marx notes that in his contemporary music culture it is precisely the abundance of “non-whole” music at the same time oversaturates the person and leaves him hungry: “We have too much music, and because of this, too little true musical enjoyment.” (Marx, 1853: 305; translation modified)

ate sensual reception [Aufnahme] of the artwork arousal and heightened life will pour out through our nerves, joy through our soul – a life and joy such as pure artistic enjoyment can alone impart“ (Marx, 1853: 309 – 310). Musical wholeness is impossible without the immediate sensual encounter with music. It is precisely sensuality, which leads one to spiritual *Antheil* – but only if it doesn’t become an end in itself.

### Musical Wholeness and Musical Form

As the realization of spiritual content, every *musical form* is a (different) way of making the musical *I* whole in musical identification. From the most elementary components of every form up to the forms themselves, every musical whole has sense only within the *Antheil* of the musical *I* – composer or interpreter – to it, or, by analogy, in the belonging of this whole to the *Innerlichkeit* of the *I*. It is within musical identification that the *I* makes sense of the wholes in music. The musical form and its component parts are not only means in the hands of the composer (or in help of the interpreter), but entities, internalized by the *I*. Only on the basis of this full internalization of musical forms can the *I* “work” with them freely, as it composes or interprets.


In the following pages, a couple of examples will be given in this respect. However, in order to be able to follow Marx in his theoretical explanations, a quick introduction into some of the basic concepts in his work will be necessary. Marx considers the origin of musical form in the organic succession “rest-movement-rest” (Marx, 1868b: 604). Every formal externalization is based on this principle. The most basic formal wholes, according to Marx – or “the three fundamental forms [Grundformen] of every musical making-whole [Gestaltung]” – are the so-called *Satz*, *Gang* u *Periode*<sup>4</sup>: „In them we have the first fully constructed in itself whole [Gestaltung], i.e. *the first artform*” (Marx, 1847: 15). *Gänge* are the “mobile, the *Sätze* the defined, completed; the *Periode* requires the most considerate rounding and arrangement [Gliederung]” (Marx, 1857: 334). An elementary example of a *Satz* is an ascending melodic movement in C major, such as the following<sup>5</sup>:

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<sup>4</sup> Due to their idiomatic meanings in Marx’s work, I will follow Burnham and Watkins in not translating these terms in English. For non-German speakers it must be noted that *Sätze* is the plural of *Satz* and *Gänge* the plural of *Gang*.

<sup>5</sup> Example from: Marx, 1868a: 27.

Example 1.



The melody is relatively complete – in terms of pitch, by beginning and ending on the first degree, as well as rhythm, by being “well-arranged” (*wohl geordnet*) (Marx, 1868a: 28). This makes it a *Satz*: “We’ll call a satisfactorily completed melody, in terms of both tone content and rhythm, *Satz*” (Marx, 1868a: 28). A similar *Satz* emerges from the following melodic movement<sup>6</sup>:

Example 2.



In comparing both *Sätze* one can see that both are incomplete in themselves. Their combination, however, forms a “more complete” whole, because it conforms to the principle of the organic sequence “rest-movement-rest”, where the upper C is the culmination point of the movement<sup>7</sup>:

Example 3.



This two-part structure, arranged by two *Sätze* – *Satz* and *Gegensatz*; or *Vordersatz* and *Nachsatz* – forming a “bigger whole”, is called *Periode* (Marx, 1868a: 29). Unlike the *Satz*, which „has only a one-sided development, the *Periode* includes the other side, as well, the *Gegensatz*” (Marx, 1868a: 29).


Contrary to both the *Satz* and the *Periode*, the musical *Gang* is not (relatively) complete, but rather intentionally open (Marx, 1868a: 30):

<sup>6</sup> Example from Marx, 1868a: 28.

<sup>7</sup> Example from Marx, 1868a: 28.



Example 4.



Gänge are tone images, which “lack the conclusion, which *Sätze* u *Perioden* have [*die eines Abschlusses, wie Sätze und Perioden haben, entbehren*]” (Marx, 1868a: 30).

Already at this introductory, elementary and abstract stage of his *Kompositionslehre*, Marx reminds his students that a mature musician appropriates the described wholes – *Satz*, *Gang* and *Periode* – not as technical means for “external” operations, but within his own *Innern*: “It is moreover true, that *the mature artist* [*der fertige Künstler*] is moved in the direction of completely different goals, than ours *now*, namely to the realization of his own feelings and ideas, not simply to the general conditions of a *Satz*, or the small changes in the tone sequence and rhythm, through which we move in small steps from one image to the other. That, however, is the vocation [*Beruf*] of the master, who has already worked through all developments in his inner being [*in seinem Innern*] and has made them his own, and consequently doesn’t need to go through the whole chain again” (Marx, 1868a: 32). Even the elementary wholes, which would later serve as building blocks for formal wholes, are comprehended only in their internalization by the musician. The master doesn’t use them as means – he has identified himself with them. It is within this identification that they become “means of expression”.

The same applies to another element of musical composition – the *motive*, which is in the foundation of every *Gang*. The motive is “a tone whole [*Tongestalt*] – a group of two, three or more tones, – [which is supposed – C. V.] to make-whole [*gestalten*] a bigger tone row in its image, a tone whole, which is, as it were, a seed or a *drive*, from which the bigger tone row grows” (Marx, 1868a: 32). The motive is the starting point of any complete and coherent musical thought – the clarity and impressiveness of this thought depends on the “usage” of the motive.<sup>8</sup> Marx notes that a composer can simply alternate motives, without developing them,

<sup>8</sup> Marx finds proof of the fact that it isn’t the “inspired” apprehension of an ingenious motive, but rather its consistent usage, which is decisive for its successful application, in the first part of the *Fifth* by Beethoven (Marx, 1868a: 40). A student of music should not look for ingenious motives (“the attractive or the characteristic” [*Anziehende oder Eigentümliche*]), because “it cannot be looked for anyhow, but it can only be won by a character that has become independent and by an inner deepening in the artistic task” (Marx, 1868a: 41).



but that would only express “the absent-mindedness and indifference of the composer, who jumps from one thing to the next, without having a decisive and lasting *Antheil* to something” (Marx, 1868a: 35). Listeners to such music would also “fall into absent-mindedness and indifference”, because their *Antheil* would have nothing to “attach” to (Marx, 1868a: 35). In other words, it is always the *Antheil* of the I which defines the (authentic) usage of the motive and its musical sense. The same applies to the melody as a whole: the melody “must also be *motivated* – either to always hold on to a particular motive, or at least to the extent that one can see that the mind [Sinn] of the composer is directed at it and so that the mind of the listeners is also attracted to it. This is how the melody itself gains a particular sense [Sinn]; it is no more a pile of tones, arbitrarily strung together, but a thought, an expression of what is happening in the soul of the composer” (Marx, 1868a: 36). According to Marx, there is something within the composer and the listener, which *corresponds* to the motivated melody. Intentionally or not, Marx uses the same word for the capacity of the composer, which *participates* in music – has musical *Antheil* – and the feature of music, which makes it an “expression” of the inner life of the composer – the word *Sinn*. In musical composition and listening, the musical motive and the “motive” of the I are one the same.

After describing different ways of “using” the motive – repetition, relocation, turning around, making smaller or bigger, and rhythmical transformation (Marx, 1868a: 34 – 39) – Marx points out that these devices should not be treated as manipulations of musical “objects“, but have to be internalized by the composer: “one must take care [...] that this consciousness doesn’t stay abstract, but – insofar as he says to himself: this motive has *such and such* structure and can be transformed in such a way – to internally hear and contemplate the motive with respect to both wholes, and to hear it externally by singing and on the instrument; then consciousness will come back from its abstraction into the artistic sphere, it will become *artistic consciousness*, in which perception [*Anschauung*], feeling and understanding melt together. [...] Only if one *empathizes with* [*fühle sich... hinein*] *the rhythmic difference*, the apparent arithmetical problem will become a musical life-experience [*Erlebnis*], it will become alive [*lebendig*] and life-creative [*lebenerzeugend*]” (Marx, 1868a: 46). Here, too, it becomes clear that only the *Antheil* to a motivic development makes sense of it as a musical device. It has to be “life-experienced” (*erlebt*) – in the synthesis of perception, feeling and understand-

ing, i.e. in the synthesized totality of the human capacities – in order to “become alive” and thus be *musical*.

The origin of *musical form* and its development is also the *Antheil* of the composer. In Marx’s theory, musical forms, on the surface, grow organically from one another. For example, the two-part *Liedform* is the result of the growth of the eight-bar period into a sixteen-bar period. When the fundamental wholes of the musical surface – *Satz*, *Gang* and *Periode* – are harmonically re-interpreted, the first *Satz* (*Vordersatz*) in the eight-bar period ends on the dominant chord, because it has to retain the feeling of incompleteness and expectancy towards the second half of the period; the second *Satz* (*Nachsatz*) ends on the tonic chord<sup>9</sup>:

Example 5.



Marx shows how the period can be filled and developed in different ways. Beyond the emphasis on the harmonic *Masse* in every *Satz* (Marx, 1868a: 57), the *Periode* can undergo different rhythmical changes, which make it richer and more varied, until reaching this example:<sup>10</sup>

Example 6.



If the two *Sätze* in this example are doubled in terms of bar count, the result is a sixteen-bar *Periode*<sup>11</sup>:

<sup>9</sup> Example from Marx, 1868a: 63.

<sup>10</sup> Example from Marx, 1868a: 65.

<sup>11</sup> Example from Marx, 1868a: 66.

Example 7.



Thus the two-part *Liedform* appears. As explained by Burnham (1989: 252), the growth of the eight-bar period to a sixteen-bar period (the simplest *Liedform*) is accounted for by a strive, immanent to every part – to be a *whole*.<sup>12</sup> In order for the *Vordersatz* of the eight-bar period to form a period itself, it must itself be arranged by two *Sätze*. But because it will have to be a first *Satz* of the following sixteen-bar *Periode*, it will have to end with a half-cadence on the dominant chord; and since a repetition would arise, its own *Vordersatz* cannot itself end with a half-cadence. Thus, it ends with an imperfect tonic cadence. The *Nachsatz* from the eight-bar *Periode* also grows to a whole *Periode*, but ends with a perfect cadence.

Every such instance of “organic growth” is founded upon and motivated by the *Antheil* of the composer. This becomes clear when Marx explains how the three-part *Liedform* originates from the two-part *Liedform*: “In most cases and most naturally one begins in the two-part form with the tonic harmony and the first unfolding of the motive is realized within it. Then one steps beyond this solid ground, but through the poverty of the second *Masse* and through the rise, which overflows from the soul [*Gemüth*] into the composition, is moved to a more variable and more dynamic development, until one sinks in the end more into the fullness and rest of the first *Masse* [...] With this the form of *three-partedness* has been founded” (Marx, 1868a: 71). The

<sup>12</sup> “Each part wants to be a whole for itself” (Marx, 1868a: 68).

reason for the appearance of the three-part *Liedform* is the tension within the composer himself, which “overflows from his soul into the composition” in wanting to express itself. Outside of the composer’s identification with, or *Antheil* to, music, no “objective” evolution of the form is possible. The origination of musical form and its (organic) development takes place within the composer who is identified with music – every “new” form corresponds to an internal musical “content” in the composer.

The reason for the transition between the *Liedformen* : 81 – 96) and the variation forms<sup>13</sup> – and the *Rondoformen* follows the same principle. The starting point of the *Rondoform* is the *Liedsatz*, which, however, is now re-interpreted as insufficient, not fully gratifying (and becomes *Hauptsatz*). The reason for this is, once more, a necessity, which the composer senses within himself: “This can naturally be the case only when the *Satz* itself, in itself or in the soul [Gemüth], according to the mood or arousal of the composer, is not fully gratifying. Because if it was satisfactory in and of itself, it would need to go no further; rather, anything more would be superfluous, and later burdening and disruptive. How do we now recognize, that a formally fully completed *Satz* – because this is by definition an explicit premise – is not satisfying for itself and requires further development outside of itself? Since here we can only talk about *inner* satisfaction, (because the *external* lies in formal roundedness and completeness), we should not, of course, think about external and thus absolutely definite features. We can only say: a *Satz* is not satisfactory in itself, when it evokes a spiritual movement, which it cannot fulfill, – when it evokes a content, which it cannot exhaust in itself” (Marx, 1868b: 96). The *Liedsatz* appears as insufficient not on the basis of formal criteria – because it is “formally” complete – but on the basis of the spiritual content, the *Idee*, which lies behind it. However, the spiritual content has sense only within the inner state of the I: “because every spiritual content is capable of immeasurable expansion in various directions, it depends, to a large extent, on the individuality and the situational [jedesmaligen] mood [of the composer – C. V.] at which point he will want to limit oneself and in which direction he will want to spread out” (Marx, 1868b: 96). In the I, which is identified with music – and musically “whole” – lies the origin of every musical form.

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<sup>13</sup> “In the variation form, the *Satz* with *Lied-form* serving as the theme was so decidedly the most important thing that there was no room for anything else *beside it*, and everything else was only changes, additions, etc. to it. In this respect, we had *not* essentially progressed *beyond the Lied* with the whole endeavour; each variation is basically nothing more than a modified repetition of the song.” (Marx, 1868b: 94)

That this is a fundamental position for Marx, is clear on every step of his analyses. In an analysis of the rondo in the fourth movement of Sonata no. 2 in A major by Beethoven, Marx engages critically the abundance of repetitions of the *Hauptgedanke* within the standard (fourth) rondo form and the *Anhang*: “Still, one will not be able to deny the feeling that something too much is happening here. The *Hauptsatz* is exhausted after its third occurrence and the repeated, rich *Durchführung* of its *Hauptgedanke*, which is now being presented to us for the *ninth time* and is partly executed, partly implied in the *Anhang eleven more times*, reminds of that border, which the Rondo will hardly overstep successfully. – The most internally moved mind [Sinn] of the immortal tone poet, this mind, which sank ever deeply in itself in the loneliness of deafness and the being by oneself, often forgot – faced with the inexhaustibility of its sensation – to keep this reasonable time border, within which the less deeply aroused souls are left without complaint and which they respect; it was a condition of his nature, which, as everything mortal, had to have its imperfect [mangelhaft] sides” (Marx, 1868b: 184).

*Example 8. The Hauptgedanke of the fourth movement of Sonata no. 2 in A major by Beethoven*



The analysis of the Sonata no. 2 in A major is an example of how Marx considers the character of a composer as decisive for his formal decisions.<sup>14</sup> The inexhaustibility of his sensation makes Beethoven exhibit some musical material excessively, in this case the main motive of the *Hauptsatz*. Beethoven cannot master the content, which is given to him, and his own inner attitude – Marx would say “mood” or “individuality” – makes him reiterate it again and again. As a formal part, the *Anhang* lets him do that, but precisely from the point of view of the *content* this repetition is, according to Marx, unwarranted. This is arguably also a case in which the *Antheil* of the

<sup>14</sup> It is an altogether different matter that the Sonata in A major op. 2 is one of Beethoven's earliest works and was composed long before the period in which he began to lose his hearing – the period Marx alludes to.

composer to the musical work – or, specifically, to its spiritual content – is what guides the compositional process. Even if one were to agree with Marx that there is a compositional “mistake” in this movement, which the “less deeply aroused” listener would recognize, this would not mean that the musical wholeness is not present *within* Beethoven, but that it simply hasn’t been *expressed* in the best way possible. At the same time it is clear that, if there is such wholeness, we have no reason to believe that it was given to Beethoven in a different way than the one, which was embodied in the musical work and in which the interpreter or listener could *participate*. Thus, Marx’s remark has sense only in a pedagogical perspective – it provides an example for something, which would normally have to be avoided, but the musical validity of which cannot be denied, if and insofar as the musical *Antheil* of the composer, interpreter or listener, is given.

The development of the *Sonatinenform* and the *Sonatenform* is also based in the inner drive and state of the composer. The sonatina is “evoked” in the soul of the composer: “this form [i.e. the sonatina – C. V.] is evoked as every other form through the content of the tone work, as it is born and made whole [ausgestaltet] in the soul of the composer, or more specifically: it is nothing other than this making-whole [Ausgestaltung]” (Marx, 1868b: 203)<sup>15</sup>. And while the spiritual content in the sonatina evokes the close connection between *Hauptsatz* and *Saitensatz*, a deeper spiritual content will need a middle, developmental *Satz*, i.e. it will need the sonata form. Here the repetition of one or two *Sätze* – as in the rondo forms and the sonatina – is not enough: “The mere repetition of one *Satz* already shows the desire [Interesse] to, as it were, hold on to it as a possession. In the rondo forms especially the *Hauptsatz* served as a firm moment of the whole, to which one would return to repeat it over and over again. A higher desire [Interesse] is revealed in the sonata form. It no longer finds satisfaction in reproducing the

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<sup>15</sup> The conditions for the emergence of the sonatina are already given in the fourth and fifth rondo forms, in which the *Hauptsatz* and the first *Saitensatz* are repeated together and thus form a higher unity: “It is no longer *the individual* (individual *Sätze*) in its *individuality* that is to be valid, but the inner union of the individuals (individual *Sätze*) into a whole, that is, the *whole* in its inner *unity* becomes the most important thing” (Marx, 1868b: 201). But, as Marx notes, the relationship between the fourth and fifth rondo forms and the sonata form is only external: “At first glance, this form appeared to be a reduction of the fifth rondo form to two parts by eliminating the middle part. But it is clear that such a conception was intended only as a provisional illustration, to assure us only provisionally that we already had all the conditions and prerequisites of the new form in hand” (Marx, 1868b: 202 – 203). The actual realization of the sonatina requires a spiritual content given in the musical wholeness between composer and work.



*Satz*, which has to be held firmly, as a dead possession, but rather enlivens it, lets it change, to repeat in different ways and at different points in time, – it makes from the *Satz an Other*, which is recognized as an offspring of the first and at the same time [enters – C. V.] in its stead” (Marx, 1868b: 222). In his “desire” or “interest”, the composer senses the necessity for the content to be enlivened and thus to be made whole *as* a sonata, in a “sonata way”. Every such enlivenment of musical content is actually its internal experiencing *by* the I (the composer or interpreter) in its identification with music.

The whole structuring of the sonata is based on the musical identification between composer and work. Just how long the second movement of the sonata will be, for example, is defined by the content, which the composer senses in his *Antheil* to it: “Just how far one must go, must be decided in each particular case, according to its specific tendency [...] when specific reasons (which arise from the content and the mood of the composition) do not require something else, one does well to give the different parts [Partien] a certain proportionality or balance between each other, so that the second part is *roughly* as long as the first one, the part of the repeating *Hauptsatz* or *Saitensatz* is *roughly* the same as the previous or the next *Gangmasse*, and so forth. This proportionality of the formation [Gestaltung] is the expression of the regular *Antheil* and overview, which should reign in the composer for all parties of his creation [...] However, the striving for such proportionality should never degenerate into frightful *checking* and *counting* of bars, especially in the process of composing; this would be the death of all artistic movement” (Marx, 1868b: 245). According to Marx, the general inclination towards proportionality of formal parts in the work is a good (pedagogical) starting point. But the decisive fact in the compositional process is not this inclination, but rather the content and mood of the composition, which can only be sensed in the participative relation (*Antheil*) of the composer to the content. The proportionality of the composition form is an “expression” of – and, strictly speaking, is identical to – the “proportionality” of the composer’s *Antheil* to the work. It is a proportionality that the composer finds within himself, as *his own*.

## Conclusion

The significance of musical *Antheil* in Marx’s theoretical work is immense. Whether one is a student of composition, a musical analyst, or simply a music lover from the educated public, the “participatory belonging” to music is a necessary prerequisite for their musical understanding and a



foundation of their musical experience. The topic of musical *Antheil*, or, more broadly, of *musical identification*, is, however, not confined to Marx's work, but belongs to a special field of theoretical inquiry into music. It is an articulation of a self-evident, but generally unthematized, aspect of musical experience and all subsequent (theoretical) reflections on it, which is arguably a cornerstone of all, practical or theoretical, musical activity. In the overlapping between the inner *state* of the I and the whole *in* music, it becomes clear, that "wholeness" is not characteristic of music in itself, but rather, of the relation between the I and music. To perceive a whole in music is to participate in it, or to identify with it. A musical whole exists as such only as a state of the I – the spiritual content of the musical work is *identical* to the spiritual state of the I, which experiences the work. To Marx this phenomenon is fundamental not only in abstract and philosophical terms, but also in the practice of music education and analytical discourse.

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